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RATINGS GAMES WITH CONTINGENT
TRANSFER: A STRUCTURED FINANCE
ILLUSION
PETRINA R. DAWSON*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Rating agencies1 have been increasingly asked to give a struc-
tured finance rating to non-U.S. transactions that rely on post-closing
events to transfer any legal or beneficial interest in the assets identi-
fied for securitization.2  Because these transactions are contingent on
the occurrence of subsequent events, they may never happen.  In this
Article, I examine some of the fundamental principles of securitiza-
tion and the difficulties inherent in perfection of asset transfers.  In
particular, I argue that contingent transfers do not provide the kind
of meaningful credit enhancement in a transaction that is consistent
with structured finance methodology.3  Behind the terminology, a
*Managing Director and Associate General Counsel, Standard & Poor’s.  The opinions ex-
pressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not necessarily reflect the views of
S&P.  The author would like to thank Joanne W. Rose, Senior Managing Director and General
Counsel, S&P, for synthesizing the approach to structured finance adopted in this Article and
for invaluable insights into legal issues present in asset transfers; and Anthony Bankes-Jones,
Partner at Clifford Chance, London, for his contribution to the secured loan criteria of S&P.
Thanks are also due to Venkat Veerubhotla, paralegal, S&P, for research assistance.
1. In the United States. there are four nationally recognized statistical rating organiza-
tions: Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group, Moody’s Investors Service, Inc., Fitch Investors Serv-
ice, Inc., and Duff & Phelps, Inc.  Each of these agencies has specific rating criteria and differ-
ing approaches to rating transactions, and in particular structured finance.  Each rating agency
publishes its criteria.  The author can only speak based on her knowledge of S&P criteria and
methodology.
2. See Joanne W. Rose & Petrina R. Dawson, Contingent Transfer—The Illusory Promise
of Structured Finance, S&P STRUCTURED FINANCE, Sept. 1997, at 10.  Contingent transfers are
currently a “hot topic among structured finance market participants who are seeking new ways
to enhance securitization.”  Jennifer Lachanski, Standard & Poor’s Announces View on Con-
tingent Transfer in Structured Finance, S&P CREDITWEEK, Aug. 27, 1997, at 8.  The reason is
that “the rating . . . can reduce for investors the cost of information and expert evaluation of the
borrowers’ credit risk; consequently, ratings can lower the cost of capital . . . .”  1 TAMAR
FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET POOLS, AND
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES 393 (1991 & Supp. 1994) [hereinafter 1 FRANKEL].
3. The official view of the Standard & Poor’s Structured Finance Rating Group, which is
similar to that of the author, is that “transactions using ‘contingent transfers’ or ‘contingent per-
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contingent transfer provides no assets and therefore no ultimate re-
covery in stress scenarios.  In short, contingent transfers amount to a
structured finance illusion.
II.  THE RATING CONTINUUM
An issue credit rating assigned to a particular financial instru-
ment addresses the likelihood that the issuer will be able to pay full
principal and interest on the rated security in a timely manner and in
accordance with the terms of the security.4  The rating of a security,
then, is based on the general creditworthiness of the issuer, the prob-
ability of the issuer’s default, and the value of any assets or other
credit enhancement that support the rated issue.5
At one end of the rating continuum is the unsecured debt of an
issuer.6  Further along the continuum is the issuer’s secured debt.  If,
in addition to its promise to pay, the issuer identifies and pledges
collateral available for repayment of the rated securities, then a given
security may be “enhanced,” that is, rated above the issuer credit
rating.7  The degree of rating enhancement will depend generally on
fection’ mechanisms should not be rated higher than the transferor’s issuer credit rating.”
Lachanski, supra note 2, at 8.  See also Rose & Dawson, supra note 2, at 10.
4. See Salomon B. Samson & Gail I. Hessol, Ultimate Recovery in Ratings: A Conceptual
Framework, S&P CREDITWEEK, Nov. 6, 1996, at 25 (“Standard & Poor’s issuer credit rat-
ings . . . address the risk of full and timely payment on all obligations of this entity.  Issue rat-
ings also take into account ultimate recovery . . .”) (emphasis in original).  All rating definitions
criteria and rating methodology used in this Article refer exclusively to definitions of S&P
Rating Services.  For an overview of S&P’s ratings, see STANDARD & POOR’S, CORPORATE
RATINGS CRITERIA 7 (1998) (detailing rating definitions) [hereinafter RATINGS CRITERIA].
For a discussion of ratings by other agencies, see 1 SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS 7-
63 to 7-82 (Jason H. P. Kravitt ed., 1991) [hereinafter KRAVITT].
5. The rating for the issued security should not be mistaken for the rating for the issuer,
which can be a corporation or a country.  See generally RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 4, at 4.
As the creditworthiness for a specific transaction usually cannot exceed the creditworthiness of
the issuer, the rating for the issuer is a “ceiling” for the rating of the issue, unless credit en-
hancement is used to bolster the rating of the security.  Different methods of credit enhance-
ment exist, e.g. letter of credit, third party insurance, over-collateralization.  See KRAVITT, su-
pra note 4, at 7-20.  To determine the actual rating, many different factors are considered by
rating agencies.  The factors vary depending on the underlying transaction, the asset and even
the country involved.  See, e.g., Diane Audino, Securitizing Vacation Homes Loans in Mexico,
S&P CREDITWEEK, July 31, 1996, at 15; Heidi J. Oster & Ellen C. Welsher, Rating Structured
Settlement Securitization, S&P CREDITWEEK, June 25, 1997, at 27.
6. In this case, due to the lack of credit enhancement means, the issue credit rating is
based solely on the general creditworthiness of the issuer reflecting the likelihood of an issuer
default.  Therefore the issue credit rating is the same as the issuer credit rating.
7. See Rose & Dawson, supra note 2, at 10.  Because the different forms of credit en-
hancement (e.g., over-collateralization, letter of credit) all involve costs, the issuer has to de-
termine whether the reduced cost of capital for a better rating outweighs the “enhancement
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the probability of default by the issuer and the ultimate recovery on
the assets pledged as collateral, including some assessment of the
timing of recovery.8
At the far end of the continuum are true structured financings.
In general, a true structured finance (or securitization)9 legally iso-
lates assets from a transferor’s insolvency to enable a purchaser of
securities backed by the assets to rely solely on the creditworthiness
of those assets.10  Thus, the structure seeks to insulate payment on the
issued securities from entities (such as sellers or pledgors of assets)
that are either unrated or have issuer credit ratings lower than the
desired issue credit rating.11  Relying on the insulation of assets in
structured financings, Standard & Poor’s is able to base its ratings of
securities on the creditworthiness of the isolated assets, without re-
gard to the creditworthiness of the original owner of the assets.12
When analyzing structured financings, Standard & Poor’s ini-
tially examines whether the securitized assets can be sufficiently
separated from the transferor that an insolvency of the transferor will
not affect the creditworthiness of the assets.13  Once it is determined
that the assets are sufficiently separated, then the creditworthiness of
the asset pool is subject to review, taking into consideration any legal
costs.”  See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 360.
8. See RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 4, at 65; STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED
FINANCE RATINGS ASSET BACKED SECURITIES: TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA 21-30 (1996)
[hereinafter TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA].  See generally KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 7-16.
For a detailed description of different factors influencing the extent of any enhancement, see
Samson & Hessol, supra note 4, at 25.
9. Some authors distinguish between the terms securitization and structured finance.  See
KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 1-12.
10. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 43.  See also STEPHEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION
16 (2d ed. 1993) [hereinafter SCHWARCZ]; KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 1-12.
11. This “insulation” primarily involves issues regarding bankruptcy law.  The critical
question is whether the structure makes the asset “bankruptcy remote.”  See SCHWARCZ, supra
note 10, at 16.
12. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 6 (“The rating of structured fi-
nancing is based primarily on the creditworthiness of isolated assets or asset pools, whether
sold or pledged to secure debt, and without regard to the creditworthiness of the seller or
buyer.”).  See also Kristin Brooks et al., A Structured Finance Alternative to Reinsurance, S&P
CREDITWEEK, Nov. 13, 1996, at 28 (“The rating of structured financing is based primarily on
the creditworthiness of the isolated assets.”).
13. For a general description of Standard & Poor’s rating process, see RATINGS CRITERIA,
supra note 4, at 11.  For a more detailed description of the process in the context of structured
finance, see TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 5; STANDARD & POOR’S,
STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS: SECURITIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA 13 (1997).
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issues that may affect the cash flow of the transaction.14  In each case,
the methodology is tailored to the law of the relevant jurisdiction.15
For example, evaluation of securitizations may differ in civil law
and common law jurisdictions.16  Because of the formality of the civil
codes, the inability to rely on equitable principles, and the scarcity or
uncertainty of precedent to define the law, civil law jurisdictions pose
special problems for securitization.17  While in many cases these
problems have been removed by the enactment of specific securitiza-
tion laws,18 the challenge in reviewing civil law transactions is to
guard against an equity-like or common law analysis that may not be
14. See RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 4, at 14-54; TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra
note 8, at 5-20; SECURITIZATION IN LATIN AMERICA, supra note 13, at 13-18.
15. It is beyond the scope of this Article to describe in-depth the structured finance criteria
used in each of the jurisdictions that has one or more rated transactions.  But to illustrate the
point, in December 1996 commercial mortgage securitizations “debuted” in France when Un-
ion Industrielle de Crédit securitized commercial real estate loans.  In order to rate this securi-
tization, S&P had to amend the U.S.-based analysis to incorporate particular aspects of French
borrowing entities and French bankruptcy laws.  See Valerie Hart, Commercial Mortgage Secu-
ritization Debuts in France, S&P CREDITWEEK, Dec. 4, 1996, at 17.  For documentation on
how insolvency laws differ, see generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY (1993).
16. For publications on securitization in non-U.S. jurisdictions, especially civil law jurisdic-
tions, see William D. Torchiana, Asset Securitization in France, 1990 INT’L BUS. L.J. 825; Rich-
ard Parolai & Jonathan Lewis, France Boots Securitization Market, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Jan.
1998, at 13; Jean-Charles Papeions, Asset-Securitization: A Comparative Study Between the U.S.
& Belgium, 1996 INT’L BUS. L.J. 341; Michael T. Kawachi, The New Law of Asset Securitization
in Japan, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 587 (1994); Yoshiki Shimeda & Shinji Itoh, Japanese
Asset Securitization: A Guide for Practitioners, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 171 (1997); Paul Taylor,
The Development of Securitization in Europe, THE FINANCIER, Dec. 1994, at 33; Gary J. Kopff,
Asset Securitization in Argentina and Colombia, THE FINANCIER, Aug. 1994, at 52; Irene Dias
Da Silva & Edmundo Nejm Junior, Legal Memoranda: Brazil: Asset Securitization, 26 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 611 (1995); José A. Trujilo, The Securitization of Mortgages in
Spain, THE FINANCIER, Dec. 1994, at 14; Peter V. Maher, Securitization Special Purpose Vehi-
cles in Dublin’s International Financial Services Centre, TAX MGMT. FIN. PRODUCTS REP., July
4, 1997, at 382 [hereinafter Dublin]; Peter V. Maher, An Irish Home For Your SPV, INT’L
ASSET-BACKED SEC. REP., Feb. 4, 1998, at 1 [hereinafter Irish].  For an overview and analysis
of several European countries, see ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE (Theodor
Baums & Eddy Wymeersch eds., 1996).
17. An example of this is Germany, where it is not impossible to securitize, but where due
to the lack of a special statutory framework it is more cumbersome.  See generally Gerhard-
Christoph Ihle, Germany, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE, supra note 16, at
87; Taylor, supra note 16, at 48.  Another example is Japan, which only allows the use of the its
securitization law for certain receivables.  See Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 174.  In other
cases, another method has to be found.
18. For example, France enacted a law to make securitization easier in 1988.  See Torchi-
ana, supra note 16, at 825.  This law was largely modified in 1993, and additional changes were
made in Fall of last year.  See Parolai & Lewis, supra note 16, at 13; see also Alain Couret,
France, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE, supra note 16, at 25.  Japan also re-
cently enacted laws to make this process easier.  See Kawachi, supra note 16, at 587.
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supported by the civil code or the securitization laws.
By contrast, in common law jurisdictions an issuer may be
tempted to stretch the bounds of reasoned analysis beyond the level
of comfort consistent with a highly rated transaction.19  Rating crite-
ria, however, should not go beyond the general consensus of the rele-
vant legal community.20  Wholesale export of U.S. criteria and meth-
odology is generally not helpful in non-U.S. transactions.
Nonetheless, experience has shown that many elements of securitiza-
tion first developed in the United States, such as special purpose enti-
ties (SPEs), have become important building blocks for non-U.S.
transactions.21
III.  STRUCTURED TRANSACTIONS: AN OVERVIEW
A structured financing seeks to insulate transactions from enti-
ties that are rated lower than the transaction, are unrated, or for
which the rating is unable to quantify the likelihood of bankruptcy.22
Such transactions are analyzed on the basis of the credit quality of
the assets and the level of credit enhancement provided by the struc-
ture.23  The analysis usually assumes that each transaction participant
that is rated lower than the transaction, or is not a “bankruptcy-
remote entity,”24 will become insolvent during the time the rated se-
19. An example of very avant-garde theory is Professor Schwarcz’s article on divisible in-
terest.  See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts Are Greater Than the Whole: How Securitization of
Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and Open the Capital Markets to Mid-
dle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 139.
20. An example of such a general consensus can be found in Peter V. Pantaleo et al., Re-
thinking the Role of Recourse in the Sale of Financial Assets, 52 BUS. LAW. 159 (1996).
21. This can be seen by reviewing the legal framework for several non-U.S. jurisdictions.
They all use concepts like SPE or pay attention to the issue of bankruptcy or true sale.  As Pro-
fessor Schwarcz points out in his introductory article, dealing with securitization in a different
jurisdiction is “like learning a new language, but one that has remarkable similarities to our
own legal language if one focuses on the fundamentals.”  Steven L. Schwarcz, Introduction: The
Universal Language of Cross-Border Finance, 8 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 235, 235-36 (1998)
(citations omitted).  See also KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 1-10 (“At the same time, because the
fundamentals of securitization are so basic . . . the process of securitization and the underlying
structures utilized will be similar to a meaningful degree wherever one seeks to securitize such
assets.  This may be even so in different countries.”).  For information on Japanese, European
and Latin-American frameworks for securitization, see materials cited in note 16, supra.
22. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 43.
23. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 397 (“Regardless of the nature of the Pool assets,
rating agencies also examine the relevant risk concentration in the portfolios . . . and the record
of loan delinquency and default . . . .  In addition, the value of the collateral and any credit en-
hancement is surveyed.”).
24. See discussion in Part IV, infra.  For an extended discussion of bankruptcy remoteness,
see SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 16.
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curities are outstanding.25
As a general matter, a pledge of assets by a transferor as collat-
eral for rated securities being issued in a structured transaction does
not ensure that holders of the rated securities will have timely access
to the collateral if the transferor becomes the subject of an insolvency
proceeding.26  Although, as a matter of law, a creditor ultimately
should be able to realize the benefits of pledged collateral,27 several
provisions of the insolvency laws may cause the creditor to experi-
ence delays in payment and, in some cases, receive less than the full
value of its collateral.  In the United States, under Section 362(a) of
the Bankruptcy Code the filing of a bankruptcy petition automati-
cally “stays” all creditors from exercising their rights to pledged col-
lateral.28  Although a bankruptcy court may provide relief from the
stay under certain circumstances,29 it is difficult to predict the likeli-
hood of relief from the stay,30 or estimate its duration should relief be
granted.31  Similarly, under Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code,32 a
bankruptcy court may permit a debtor to use pledged collateral to aid
in the debtor’s reorganization or, according to Section 364, to incur
debt with a lien on assets that is prior to the lien of existing credi-
tors.33  Under Section 542, a secured creditor in possession of its col-
lateral may be required to return the collateral to a bankrupt obli-
gor.34
As a result, the existence of strong assets to secure the rated se-
curities cannot independently determine the issue credit rating of the
securities.  However, the structure of the transaction ensures both
timely interest payments on the rated securities and ultimate recov-
ery of principal upon maturity, notwithstanding the insolvency, re-
ceivership, or bankruptcy of the transferor.35
25. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 43
26. For an extended discussion of the effects of bankruptcy, see 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2,
at 405-24.  See also SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 37.
27. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 1129(a) (1994).
28. See id. § 362(a) (1994).
29. Id. § 362(d) provides criteria for the court for a case-by-case determination of whether
to lift a stay.  For application of these criteria see, for example, In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d
571, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1983).  See also 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 406.
30. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 43.
31. See id.
32. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1994).
33. See id. § 364 (1994).
34. See id. § 542 (1994).
35. A good example of how effective those structures can be is the 1991 voluntary bank-
ruptcy of Days Inn of America.  While this case revealed some of the problems with structured
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In general, the desired structure is achieved by having a pool of
assets held by a transferor transferred to a bankruptcy-remote, spe-
cial-purpose entity (SPE),36 which in turn either functions (1) as an
intermediate SPE and transfers the assets to an issuing SPE that is-
sues the rated securities in a two-tier transaction,37 or (2) as an issuing
SPE which directly issues the rated securities in a one-tier transac-
tion.38
To ensure that a given transaction structure (whether two-tier or
one-tier) provides for the timely availability of assets to pay the hold-
ers of the rated securities,39 a rating agency usually looks at each
transfer of assets to determine whether it constitutes a sale or a
pledge,40 the nature of each party’s property rights in the assets,41 and
whether third parties (that may be unrated or “non-bankruptcy re-
mote”) have retained rights that may impair timely payment on the
rated securities.42
financing (e.g., the voluntary bankruptcy of a bankruptcy remote SPE to facilitate the sale of
assets), it is notable for showing one real strength: all the secured noteholders were repaid
promptly with only a slight discount.  See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 13 (discussing Days Inn
bankruptcy); In re Buckhead Am. Corp., 161 B.R. 11 (Bankr. D. Del. 1993) (same).  The
strength of structured financing is also illustrated in the 1992 bankruptcy of P.A. Bergner & Co.
In this debtor-in-possession case, Bergner sold credit card receivables to a bankruptcy remote
SPE.  Using over-collateralization and credit support to ensure payment and 100% liquidity to
ensure timeliness of payment, together with the quality of the asset itself, Bergner received the
highest ratings from Moody’s, Duff & Phelps, and Standard & Poor’s.  See SCHWARCZ, supra
note 10, at 44 & nn. 99, 100 (discussing Bergner case); In re P.A. Bergner v. Bank One, 187
B.R. 964 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1995) (same).  See also Stephen I. Glover, Asset-Backed Securitiza-
tions by Companies in Chapter 11, INSIGHTS, Jan. 1993, at 17.
36. Instead of SPE, other terms are used in different contexts.  For example: SPV (special
purpose vehicle), see SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 1; SPC (special purpose corporation), see 1
FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 440; SIV (structured investment vehicle), see Valeria Hart, Struc-
tured Deals Give Rise to Investment Vehicle, S&P CREDITWEEK, July 2, 1997, at 14; SSC
(structured settlement company), see Oster & Welsher, supra note 5, at 27.  The underlying
idea is nevertheless the same.
37. For a discussion of two-tier transactions, see Part III.A, infra.  See also SCHWARCZ,
supra note 10, at 21; KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 4-64.
38. See KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 4-3.
39. As Neil Baron, Fitch General Counsel, noted: “Timeliness is an element rating agen-
cies are obsessive about.” Neil D. Baron, The Role of Rating Agencies in the Securitization
Process, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION, 81, 88 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman
eds., 1996).
40. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 43.
41. See id. at 46.
42. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 399; TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at
43.
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A.  Fundamentals of the Two-Tier Transaction43
In the typical two-tier transaction,44 the rated securities are is-
sued by an issuing SPE.45  In the first tier, each transferor holding as-
sets (who, in general, has either originated the assets or purchased
the assets in a chain of transfers from the originator) either sells the
assets to an intermediate SPE46 or makes a capital contribution of the
assets to the intermediate SPE.47  In the second tier, the intermediate
SPE deposits or sells the assets to the issuing SPE, or borrows from
the issuing SPE and pledges the assets to the issuing SPE to secure
the loan.48  The issuing SPE then issues the rated securities and uses
the proceeds of the rated securities either to purchase the assets from
the intermediate SPE (if the second-tier transfer constitutes a sale) or
to make a loan to the intermediate SPE (if the second-tier transfer
constitutes a pledge).49  The intermediate SPE uses the proceeds of
the sale or loan to purchase the assets from the transferors.50
To avoid the risk that bankruptcy may cause a court to deem
some or all of the assets transferred to the intermediate SPE to be
part of the transferor’s bankruptcy estate (and thus subject to the
automatic stay or distribution to other creditors of the transferor),
each transfer should be structured as a “true sale.”51  Thus, each
43. See generally SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 21.  See also KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 4-
64; Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of The Association of the Bar of
the City of New York, Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 573 (1995).  I use
two-tier transactions as an example because one-tier transactions are analytically similar but
simpler, requiring merely a direct transfer to the SPE issuer.
44. Two-tier transactions are often used in cross-border securitization, as this structure not
only allows the assets to be isolated from the sovereign risk of the originator’s jurisdiction, but
also from U.S. bankruptcy risks.  See Douglas A. Doetsch, Emerging Market Cash Flow Securi-
tizations Take Off, INT’L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1996, at 18.  “In the most common two-tier struc-
ture, the originator sells receivables to a special purpose trust organized under Cayman Islands
law, which issues certificates that are sold in turn to a U.S. master trust.”  Id.
45. See KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 4-65; SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 22.
46. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 21.
47. The intermediate SPE is usually a wholly-owned subsidiary of one of the transferors.
See Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133, 142
(1994) [hereinafter Alchemy].
48. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 22.
49. See id.  See also Alchemy, supra note 47, at 142.
50. Another possibility is to merge the intermediate SPE back into the originator or have
a dividend distribution.  See Alchemy, supra note 47, at 142.
51. “True sale” means the transaction effectively transfers the ownership of the asset to
the SPE.  For an extensive discussion of true sale, see SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 28;
KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 7-56; Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 43, at 542.  See
also Parts V.B.1 and 2, infra.  For a detailed evaluation of the role of recourse in the context of
true sale, see generally Pantaleo, supra note 20.
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transfer of assets in the full chain of transfers to the intermediate SPE
must be reviewed in accordance with the factors courts generally look
to in determining whether a transfer is a true sale or a secured loan.52
Sometimes assets may pass through multiple owners before coming
to rest in the intermediate SPE.53
B.  Secured Loan Transactions
There are two types of transactions where the special nature of
the originator has made it acceptable to use a secured loan rather
than an SPE as a means of separating the creditworthiness of the as-
sets from that of the originator.  First, some government entities, such
as state-funded housing agencies or military agencies, may be
deemed bankruptcy remote because of their governmental purpose
and lack of creditor incentive (or ability) to force them into bank-
ruptcy.54  The governmental entity even if technically insolvent would
continue to make payments on the underlying assets pledged to the
transaction, and it would not redirect the amounts to satisfy the
claims of other creditors.  Thus, the risk of default is low.  A secured
loan, therefore, provides the required comfort.55
52. As Professor Schwarcz points out, “different readers [of case law] can argue as to
which factors are relevant and which entitled to the greater weight.”  SCHWARCZ, supra note
10, at 31.  However, the most important factor seems to be the degree of recourse.  The mere
presence of recourse does not automatically mean characterization as a loan, however; rather,
it depends on the nature of recourse and the nature of the transaction.  See id.  See also Pan-
taleo, supra note 20, at 162.  Another important factor is the retained rights of the originator,
including any right to surplus.  Both factors favor a loan characterization.  See SCHWARCZ, su-
pra, at 32.  The pricing mechanism and the actual administration and collection of accounts re-
ceivables also influence this characterization.  See id. at 32, 33.  For a list of additional factors
courts have considered, see id. at 34.
53. An example of a multiple transfer is the Resolution Trust Company securitization
loans sold by RTC (as liquidator of insolvent S&L) to an investment banker that deposited into
an SPE depositor, which in turn transferred to a trust.  See Roseann Catania, Merrill Lynch
Mortgage Investors Inc., S&P STRUCTURED FINANCE, Feb. 1998, at 88; Errol Arne, IMC Home
Equity Loan Owner Trust 1997-8, id. at 101.
54. See discussion of bankruptcy remoteness, infra Part V.  But compare the recent prob-
lems with municipalities like Orange County.  Depending on the circumstances, municipalities
may be able to find protection under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code.  See generally Eric S.
Pommer & Marc M. Friedman, Municipal Bankruptcy and its Effect on Government Contrac-
tors, 25 PUB. CONT. L.J. 249 (1996); James E. Spiotto, Government Bankruptcy: The Myth and
Reality of Financially Troubled Municipalities: A Ripple or a Tidal Wave, 918 PLI/CORP. 1087
(1996).
55. More recently, in some jurisdictions secured loan analysis has been extended to trans-
actions in which the originator is not deemed bankruptcy remote.  Examples include the Punch
Taverns Finance PLC transaction, see Pubs Acquisition Drafts Securitization Technology,
STRUCTURED FINANCE, Mar. 1998, at 6; and the Welcome Break Finance PLC transaction, see
Welcome Break Finance PLC, id., Oct. 1997, at 88.  See generally discussion of secured loans
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The second type of transaction involves bank originators.56  Bank
originators are not eligible to become debtors under the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Code.57  Under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act—which,
unlike the Bankruptcy Code, does not have an automatic stay provi-
sion—the FDIC acts as receiver or conservator of the financial insti-
tution in the event of bankruptcy.58  Although lacking an automatic
stay provision, the FDIC has expansive powers, including the power
to ask for a judicial stay of all payments and/or to repudiate any con-
tract.59  To provide for greater flexibility in securitized transactions,
however, the FDIC has stated that it would not seek to avoid an oth-
erwise legally enforceable and perfected security interest so long as
the following conditions are satisfied:
(1) The agreement was undertaken in the ordinary course of
business, not in contemplation of insolvency, and with no intent to
hinder, delay, or defraud the bank or its creditors;
(2) the secured obligation represents a bona fide and arm’s-
length transaction;
(3) the secured party or parties are not insiders or affiliates of
the bank;
(4)  the grant of the security interest was made for adequate con-
sideration; and
(5) the security agreement evidencing the security interest is in
writing, was duly approved by the board of directors of the bank or
its loan committee, and remains an official record of the bank.60
If the transaction complies with these conditions, the security in-
terest granted by an FDIC-insured bank should not be avoidable in
the event of the bank’s insolvency.  In addition, the FDIC has advised
that a secured creditor of an insolvent bank under the supervision of
the FDIC would not be stayed by the receiver or conservator from
securitizations infra Part V.C.  Standard & Poor’s has received proposals for rating such trans-
actions in Australia, but has not done so.
56. Originator generally means the party that transfers the assets to the SPE.  Bank origi-
nators are banks that transfer assets to an SPE.  On the issue of banks in the context of bank-
ruptcy, see 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 447.
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(b)(2) (1994).
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1994).
59. For an extensive discussion of the FDIC’s role, see generally 2 FRANKEL, supra note 2,
at 369-85.
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (1994).  See also D’Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447 (1942) (holding that a secret side agreement cannot be invoked in an
SEC action).
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pursuing its remedies,61 and, upon a bank default, a creditor could
foreclose on its collateral using commercially reasonable “self-help”
methods, if certain additional conditions are met.62
C.  General Principles for Evaluating a Structured Financing
In summary, a structured financing can be rated according to the
following factors:
(1) If the pool of assets is owned by an entity, whether that entity
is bankruptcy remote (and thus unlikely to be the subject of a bank-
ruptcy or insolvency proceeding); and
(2) whether the pool of assets supporting payments on the secu-
rities is no longer owned by the transferring entity that may be the
subject of a bankruptcy or insolvency (thus the pool of assets would
not be affected by the delays or court valuations in the bankruptcy
process); or
(3) in some jurisdictions and for some issuers, whether a secured
creditor that has a first priority perfected security interest in the pool
of assets would be prevented by a liquidator, receiver or conservator
from using self-help remedies to recover its collateral in a timely
manner.
Finally, it should be noted that the rating analysis also depends
on whether the transfer would be deemed preferential or avoidable,
or a fraudulent or gratuitous conveyance under the applicable insol-
vency laws.63  If any of these legal principles apply, the assets may be
clawed back by the liquidator or receiver of an insolvent transferor.64
Thus, without the underlying pool of assets, the issuer would not be
able to make timely and full payments of principal and interest.
IV.  BANKRUPTCY-REMOTE ENTITIES
A.  SPEs
A creation of structured finance methodology, bankruptcy re-
moteness rests on the conclusion that certain entities which issue
rated securities or, depending on the structure, transfer assets (e.g.,
61. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 448.
62. See id. (“[T]he FDIC has assured Moody’s that if investors make a loan directly to the
insolvent Institution, and the loan is collateralized by a mortgage pool, the FDIC will not attack
the investors’ lien (if perfected), absent fraud on other investors.”) (citation omitted).
63. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.
64. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1994).
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trusts, limited partnerships, limited liability companies, or corpora-
tions) should be deemed unlikely to become insolvent, to voluntarily
seek insolvency proceedings, or to become subject to the claims of
creditors (who may file an involuntary petition against the entity).65
A bankruptcy-remote special-purpose entity (SPE) is generally
defined in accordance with the following six factors.66  First, so long as
the rated securities are outstanding, the entity should be prohibited
from engaging in a merger, consolidation, or asset transfer with an
entity not rated at least as high as the rated securities, or that lacks
bankruptcy-remote, special-purpose criteria.67  Second, the entity
should be restricted from incurring additional debt.68  In the alterna-
tive, the entity’s organizational documents should prohibit the incur-
ring of additional debt other than debt rated at least as high as the
rating on the issue in question, or debt that (a) is fully subordinated
to the rated debt, (b) is nonrecourse to the issuer or any assets of the
issuer other than cash flow in excess of amounts necessary to pay
holders of the rated debt, and (c) does not constitute a claim against
the issuer to the extent that funds are insufficient to pay such addi-
tional debt.69  Third, the entity should not engage in any other busi-
ness or activity.70  Fourth, the entity should have at least one
“independent director” on the board of directors,71 and the consent of
65. Bankruptcy remoteness means to set up a structure so that the SPE is insulated from
the bankruptcy of parties other than the borrowers whose loans are held.  See 1 FRANKEL, su-
pra note 2, at 404.  Another way to say this is that bankruptcy remoteness exists when
“whatever happens to the originator cannot affect the SPV.”  SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 16.
For a concise, but detailed treatment, see Pantaleo, supra note 20, at 554.
66. For a discussion of these factors, see generally TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra
note 8, at 44; STANDARD & POOR’S, STRUCTURED FINANCE RATINGS: REAL ESTATE FI-
NANCE: LEGAL AND STRUCTURED FINANCE ISSUES IN COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES
72 (1995) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES]; James F. Penrose, Special-
Purpose Entities in Project Finance Transactions, S&P STRUCTURED FINANCE, Nov. 1995, at
69.
67. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.
68. See 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 441; TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at
44; KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 7-61.
69. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.
70. See Brooks, supra note 12, at 28-29 (“As a threshold matter, [a bankruptcy-remote]
entity’s activities should be limited to only those necessary to fulfill its role in the transac-
tion.”).  See also TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44; KRAVITT, supra note 4, at
7-61.
71. In the context of asset securitization, independent director means someone who is an
outsider with regard to the SPE and also the originator if the originator has a controlling influ-
ence on the SPE.  Therefore, for example, an independent director could be someone who is
neither an employee or officer of the company, nor in any way affiliated with the originator.
See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 17; TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.  For
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that director should be required to institute insolvency proceedings.72
Fifth, the transaction documents should contain a covenant prevent-
ing the parties from filing, instigating or joining in any involuntary
bankruptcy proceeding against the entity so long as the rated securi-
ties are outstanding.73  And finally, the entity should also agree to
abide by certain “separateness covenants” whereby the entity prom-
ises the following:
(a) To maintain books and records separate from any other per-
son or entity;
(b) not to commingle assets with those of any other entity;
(c) to conduct its business in its own name;
(d) to maintain separate financial statements;
(e) to pay its liabilities out of its own funds;
(f) to observe all corporate formalities;
(g) to maintain an arm’s-length relationship with its affiliates;
(h) to pay the salaries of its own employees;
(i) not to guarantee or become obligated for the debts of any
other entity or hold out its credit as being available to satisfy the ob-
ligations of others;
(j) to allocate fairly and reasonably any overhead for shared of-
fice space;
(k) to use separate stationery, invoices, and checks;
(l) not to pledge its assets for the benefit of any other entity; and
(m) to hold itself out as a separate entity.74
If the entity is wholly owned by a parent that is not bankruptcy
a definition employed by S&P, see Penrose, supra note 66, at 73 (“‘Independent Director’
means a duly appointed member of the board of directors . . . who shall not have been, at the
time of such appointment or at any time in the preceding five years, (a) a direct or indirect le-
gal or beneficial owner . . . [,] (b) a creditor, supplier, employee, officer, director, family mem-
ber, manager, or contractor of such entity or one of its affiliates. . . .”).
72. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.  See also KRAVITT, supra note
4, at 7-62.  This is done to prevent a voluntary petition for bankruptcy.  “Charters of SPVs usu-
ally provide that the SPV may not place itself into bankruptcy unless a requisite number of in-
dependent members of the board of directors vote for bankruptcy.”  SCHWARCZ, supra note 10,
at 17 (emphasis in original).  The idea behind this is that an independent director “theoretically
would be less influenced by the originator and more likely to consider his or her fiduciary obli-
gations when required to vote for or against the SPV’s bankruptcy.”  Id.  Another issue in vol-
untary bankruptcy is the status of charities in a trust function.  See id. at 21; KRAVITT, supra
note 4, at 4-26.
73. See COMMERCIAL MORTGAGE SECURITIES, supra note 66, at 72.
74. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.  See also Penrose, supra note
66, at 73.  Those factors are primarily important to prevent a court from substantially consoli-
dating an SPE.  For a discussion of substantive consolidation, see note 75, infra.
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remote, the analysis requires that in an insolvency of the parent, the
bankruptcy-remote entity would not be substantively consolidated
with the parent under applicable insolvency laws.75
B.  Non-U.S. SPEs
A number of countries have enacted or are in the process of en-
acting statutes designed to facilitate securitization by putting in place
a specific framework to address bankruptcy and security interest con-
cerns.76  Such laws typically define procedures that are deemed, in the
event of an insolvency of the transferor, to transfer the assets so that
they are not available to the liquidator or any third-party creditor of
the transferor.77  Some of these statutes require the use of an SPE.78
A statute may also specify the corporate formalities necessary to cre-
ate an issuing SPE, including its form (trust, fund, or corporation), its
powers, and its ownership structure.79
75. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 7.  Substantive consolidation is an
equitable doctrine which allows courts under certain circumstances to consolidate the assets
and liabilities of the SPE and the originator.  See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 24.  Piercing the
corporate veil, see infra note 90, and substantive consolidation are two sides of the same coin.
See Penrose, supra note 66, at 71.  It will be applied by the courts “based on an overly familiar
relationship between parent and the subsidiary partner and partnership.”  Id. at 72.  Several
factors are considered by courts to determine whether substantive consolidation would be justi-
fied.  See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 25; KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 7-58; 1 FRANKEL, supra
note 2, at 427 (listing such factors as the commingling of assets and business functions, unity of
interest and ownership among the two entities, and whether there are intercorporate guaran-
tees on loans).
76. In 1993, Japan enacted the Law Relating to the Regulation of Business Concerning
Specific Claims.  See Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 174.  In 1992, Belgium amended its Law
of December 4, 1990 on Financial Transactions and Financial Markets.  See Papeions, supra
note 16, at 353.  Spain passed legislation in 1992 and 1993 to allow for asset securitization as
well.  See Trujilo, supra note 16, at 15.  Ireland passed the Irish Finance Act of 1996 to facilitate
securitization.  See Dublin, supra note 16 at 382.  See also Irish, supra note 16, at 1.  Similar de-
velopments have occurred in Latin America.  Brazil has enacted specific legislation which
regulates the securitization of real estate receivables—Law No. 9,514, of November 20, 1997.
See Levy & Salomo Advogados, Real Estate Financing with Securities, LATIN AMERICAN FIN.
& CAPITAL MARKETS, Jan. 31, 1998, at 5.  See generally Silva & Junior, supra note 16, at 618-
20.  Argentina passed the Housing and Construction Financing Law in 1995; Chile its Capital
Markets Law in 1981 (Title XVIII of Law No. 18,045); and Colombia its Title III of Resolution
No. 0400 of the Superintendencia de Valores in 1995.  See Lewis Rinaudo Cohen & Jorge Cal-
deron, Developments in Domestic Latin American Securitization (handout for a presentation
about Latin American securitization held in Cancun, Mexico in May 1996) (on file with the
Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).
77. The recent Japanese Small Claims Law, for example, defines certain perfection proce-
dures.  See Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 180.
78. For example, the Japanese Small Claims Law, which requires an SPE in form of a
qualified assignee.  See id. at 177.
79. For example, the recently amended framework for securitization in France.  See inter-
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In most cases, however, the structure offered under the statute is
not mandatory or may cover only a limited number of assets.80  In
other cases, the statute may not define the SPE requirements, leaving
transaction participants with the option of structuring securitizations
under local law.  In that event, as in the case where there is no securi-
tization statute at all (or where the statute insufficiently addresses
bankruptcy remoteness concerns), the analysis generally must rely on
local corporate law to assess whether an SPE organized in that coun-
try can be bankruptcy remote and therefore used as an intermediate
or issuing SPE.
The rating agency analysis evaluates whether the purpose of the
chosen entity can be limited and whether the entity can truly be an
SPE as described above.81  It also focuses on the validity and enforce-
ability of any covenants against the entity’s incurrence of indebted-
ness and voluntary bankruptcy or reorganization.82  For instance, in a
number of jurisdictions voluntary bankruptcy filing or dissolution of
a company is a shareholder decision by statute, and any restriction of
that shareholder power (or transfer of that power to another corpo-
rate body such as the board of directors) would most likely be unen-
forceable.83  In those jurisdictions (such as Japan and France), a secu-
ritization would not be able to use a wholly-owned subsidiary of a
transferor as truly bankruptcy remote and will require that transac-
tions be structured through an orphan SPE organized offshore
(typically in a jurisdiction where the SPE will be exempt from income
taxes).84  Transactions may incorporate structural features that are of-
fered by the participants with a view to circumventing the risks iden-
tified.85
nal memorandum by the law firm Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton regarding securitization
of financial assets under French law (Nov. 17, 1997) (on file with the Duke Journal of Com-
parative & International Law) [hereinafter Cleary Memo].
80. See, for example, the Japanese Small Claims Law, which covers only certain types of
receivables.  See Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 176.  For other assets, the use of a foreign
SPE is necessary.  See id. at 175.
81. See Part IV.A, supra.  See also TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 6.
82. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 44.
83. In the U.S., it is possible to limit this power.  However, as Professor Schwarcz points
out, it seems “to be against public policy to remove entirely a company’s power to place itself
in voluntary bankruptcy.”  SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 17.
84. For example, in Japan only certain receivables are covered by the new securitization
law.  For other assets an SPE formed in a foreign jurisdiction is used.  See Shimeda & Itoh, su-
pra note 16, at 125.
85. For instance, in certain cases a pledge by the parent of the shares of its SPE subsidiary,
together with a power of attorney may, if such power of attorney is enforceable in the insol-
vency of the parent, eliminate the risk of voluntary filing described above.
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Although the six-factor analysis for defining an SPE was devel-
oped based on U.S. law and principles of substantive consolidation,86
as a general matter the limitation of powers and covenants contained
in those criteria are necessary and desirable in any jurisdiction to en-
sure that the issuing SPE continues to exist as a separate entity in-
volved in securitization only, and that its assets do not become com-
mingled with those of either its parent or seller.
In many cases, an independent director87 or a “golden share”88
plays both a necessary due diligence role in the continued perform-
ance of the issuing SPE’s obligations and reduces the likelihood of a
voluntary filing.89  Some transactions rely on the existence of a golden
share held by the trustee as an independent third party to provide
equivalent comfort.
In analyzing the structure of an SPE, a rating agency considers
whether the transferor’s jurisdiction has any theory similar to the
U.S. theories of substantive consolidation, alter ego, or piercing the
corporate veil.90  Most common law jurisdictions recognize both alter
ego and piercing the corporate veil theories.91  Civil law jurisdictions
sometimes have statutes that allow for the consolidation of affiliates
upon a showing of confusion of patrimony (assets) or exclusive deal-
86. For a description of substantive consolidation, see note 75, supra.
87. For a description of the role of independent director, see note 71, supra.
88. The concept of the “golden share” originated in Great Britain under Margaret
Thatcher’s privatization of British state own enterprises in the 1980s.  See Andrei A. Baev, Is
There a Niche for the State in Corporate Governance? Securitization of State-Owned Enterprises
and New Forms of State Ownership, 18 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1985).  It is designed to provide
the holder of the share with the power to veto major decisions of the corporation.  See id. at 23.
It can also be set up in a way that mandates its affirmative vote to achieve the required voting
percentage.  For a detailed discussion of the concept, see id. at 20-32.
89. The successful performance of their roles, however, is not guaranteed.  In the Days Inn
case, a solvent SPE filed for voluntary bankruptcy to facilitate the sale of Days Inn secured
notes.  The independent director voted for the action, together with the rest of the board.  See
SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 19.  See generally discussion of Days Inn case in note 35, supra.
90. See Penrose, supra note 66, at 71.  S&P therefore usually requests an opinion from out-
side counsel regarding the risk of consolidation—a so-called non-consolidation opinion.  See id.
at 72.  Substantive consolidation is described in note 75, supra.  For a description of the theories
of piercing the corporate veil and alter ego, see generally Sung Bae Kim, A Comparison of the
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil in the United States, 3 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L L. 73
(1995); David S. Bakst, Piercing the Corporate Veil for Environmental Torts in the United States
and the European Union: The Case for the Proposed Civil Liability Directive, 19 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 323 (1996); Carsten Alting, Piercing the Corporate Veil in American and Ger-
man Law: Liability of Individuals and Entities: A Comparative View, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT’L
L. 187 (1995).
91. See Jonathan Lux, Piercing the Corporate Veil: An English Perspective, in 1991
COMPARATIVE LAW YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 3.
DAWSON9MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:43 PM
1998] RATINGS GAMES WITH CONTINGENT TRANSFER 397
ings.92
V.  TRANSFERS OF ASSETS AND PERFECTION93
Generally, the second step in structuring a transaction is to re-
view the bankruptcy and reorganization laws of the particular juris-
diction to determine the effect of an insolvency proceeding on the as-
sets of a bankrupt entity (automatic stay equivalents, repudiation or
rejection of contracts, treatment of secured creditors, etc.).94  The
transfer of the assets should be effected in a manner that will shield
the assets from the bankruptcy risk of the transferor.95  Certain coun-
tries (such as Belgium and France) have enacted securitization stat-
utes that clearly delineate the conditions and formalities under which
the transfer must take place in order for the transfer to be a true
sale.96
A.  Potential Obstacles
Securitization laws, however, are not always successful in elimi-
nating obstacles to transfers.  General laws must be relied upon in
countries where no special statute exists, and in many jurisdictions
there are significant legal and practical obstacles to structuring a true
securitization.97  One of the more common problems is that the trans-
92. See Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 188 (describing Japanese equivalent to piercing
the veil).  In some civil law countries, like for example Spain, the technique of piercing the cor-
porate veil is created by the courts.  It is more like a common law country in this regard.  See
Jorge Angell, Piercing the Corporate Veil: A Spanish Perspective, in 1993 COMPARATIVE LAW
YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 341.  The courts play a similar role in Germany and
the Netherlands.  See generally S.M. Barman & J. Roest, Piercing the Corporate Veil in the
Netherlands and Germany: A Convergent Legal Development, in COMPARABILITY AND
EVALUATION: ESSAYS ON COMPARATIVE LAW, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN HONOR OF DIMITRA KOKKINI-IATRIDOU 3
(1994).
93. Substantial portions of Parts V and VI are taken from Rose & Dawson, supra note 2.
94. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 46.
95. This is necessary to ensure bankruptcy remoteness and true sale.  See Part IV, supra,
and Part V.B, infra.
96. See generally Eddy Wymeersch, Belgium, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN
EUROPE, supra note 16, at 25.  See also Papeions, supra note 16, at 353.  For France, see gener-
ally Couret, supra note 18, at 71.  See also Torchiana, supra note 16, at 828.  It should be noted
that in 1997 France amended the legislation referred to in those articles.  See Parolai & Lewis,
supra note 16, at 13.  See generally Cleary Memo, supra note 79.
97. An example is Japan, where the Small Claims Law covers only a relatively narrow
scope.  See Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 174.  Another, rather astonishing example is
Germany.  While one of the major economic players, it has not enacted a specific regulatory
and legal framework for securitization.  While it is possible to use securitization, the lack of
specific rules makes it more difficult.  See Ihle, supra note 17, at 88.
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fer of assets is cumbersome, time consuming, and costly.98  Depending
on the asset, the transfer (whether structured as a sale or a transfer
for security) may require either the consent or notification of the ul-
timate obligors on the underlying assets (the borrowers).99  In some
cases, a transfer requires preparation and registration of notarial
deeds and payment of stamp or transfer taxes.100  These perfection re-
quirements generally inhibit the use of structured finance as a fi-
nancing technique.  Additionally, in many cases the transferor is re-
luctant to notify the borrowers, because culturally a sale of assets
may be viewed as a last-ditch effort to stave off bankruptcy, rather
than a viable and efficient funding technique.101
A rating agency will also review the circumstances in which a
bankruptcy court in a given country may avoid a transfer of assets ef-
fected by a bankrupt debtor before the bankruptcy filing (e.g., as a
preferential transfer, transfer at undervalue, gratuitous or fraudulent
transfer), and require that safeguards be incorporated in the transac-
98. Another example of this is the transfer of receivables in France.  See Parolai & Lewis,
supra note 16, at 13 (“Under French Law it is complex and cumbersome to transfer title to re-
ceivables. . . . This process is expensive and time-consuming.”).
99. An example is Japan, which requires different methods for different assets.  For re-
ceivables (shimei-saiken) under art. 467 of the Japanese Civil Code (MINPO), notice to the ob-
ligor or the obligor’s consent is required to perfect the transfer against the obligor.  To perfect
the transfer of receivables against third parties, this notice or consent must be done in an in-
strument bearing a confirmed date.  For pledges of claims, notice or consent of the obligor is
required, see MINPO, art. 467, while pledges for certain other assets (like personal property or
real estate) employ other methods, like registration.  See MINPO, arts. 344, 352, 364.  Mortgages
and securities, and shares and bonds, use methods like delivery or registration as well.  See
MINPO arts. 86-3, 117, 178, and the Japanese Commercial Code (SHOHO), art. 205-206.  See
generally legal memorandum from Tetsuya Sho, Associate, Coudert Brothers, to Marilyn Selby
Okoshi, Partner, Coudert Brothers, discussing securitization in Japan (Mar. 18, 1998) (on file
with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law) [hereinafter Sho/Okoshi Memo].
100. The Argentine Civil Code, for example, mandates the use of public deed for mort-
gages in art. 3128, and art. 997 requires that public deeds be instrumented by public notaries.
See letter from Jorge Solari, Associate Director, S&P (Buenos Aires), to Petrina Dawson
(March 11, 1998) (on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law).  An-
other example is Ireland, which has a stamp duty for certain instruments.  See Dublin, supra
note 16, at 383.
101. This is a problem practitioners often run into.  The author has heard it in almost every
meeting in Mexico, Latin America, Germany, Thailand and Japan.  But it is a problem that is
not documented in the literature.  For a slight “hint” of the problem, see Shimeda & Itoh, supra
note 16, at 183 (“Some originators are also reluctant to disclose to the underlying debtors their
intention to sell receivables because these debtors are also their customers.”).  This problem
can also be seen reflected in the following quote: “Japanese law does not allow for public no-
tice perfection of these asset classes so, rather than give notice to powerful corporate clients,
the bank has chosen to make use of the contingent perfection system—where clients are noti-
fied and loans perfected when certain triggers are hit.”  Bank of Yokohama’s Ambitious March,
ASSET SALES REPORT INT’L, Mar. 9, 1998, at 2.
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tion documents addressing that risk.102  For example, under English
law, German law and Argentine law, one ground for preferential
claw-back of assets is that the transferee knew at the time of the
transfer that the transferor of the assets was insolvent.103  In some ju-
risdictions, the court may determine at which point, prior to a formal
insolvency filing, a transferor became de facto insolvent and establish
a “look back” period which, depending on the jurisdiction, may be
several years.104  All transfers that occurred during the look back pe-
riod are subject to avoidance by the court, regardless of whether the
transferor received fair market value for the transfer.105  To minimize
the risk of avoidance in those jurisdictions, transferors of assets and
their independent auditors must represent at closing that they are
solvent and do not know of any event that would make them insol-
vent.  Such representations need to be repeated periodically in a sol-
vency certificate if the transaction is structured with a revolving fea-
ture.  More generally, the rating analysis will focus on any legal
ground that may be used in the jurisdiction that would adversely af-
fect the cash flows of the transaction, whether retroactively or
prospectively.
B.  Defining the “Transfer”
Although the word “transfer” is often used without regard for its
scope, in non-U.S. or multi-jurisdictional transactions, a successful
transaction may depend on the precise definition of the breadth of
transfer required for securitization.
As a legal matter, a transfer can be thought of as fulfilling one or
more of three specific goals.  A transfer may be valid and enforceable
(1) against a solvent transferor, resulting in the transferee having pri-
ority against third-party creditors (a contractual matter); (2) against
the regulator (if any), debtor in possession, or a liquidator, receiver
or administrator of the transferor in an insolvency or reorganization
proceeding, and against other creditors of an insolvent transferor; or
(3) against the ultimate borrower (the obligor on the assets), enabling
102. See TRADE RECEIVABLE CRITERIA, supra note 8, at 46.
103. For Argentina, see MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 15, at A-
10; for Germany, see id. at K-7; for England, see id. at I-24.
104. For example Argentina—2 years, see id. at A-10; France—18 months, see id. at J-25;
Brazil—60 days before first nonpayment/judgment, see id. at D-8; England—6 months to 5
years, see id. at I-23.
105. See, e.g., MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 15, at J-25
(distinguishing between the period during which a transfer can be avoided, and grounds to set
aside a pre-bankruptcy transfer).
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the transferee to enforce the transfer of assets directly without rely-
ing on the transferor (e.g., the ability to foreclose on a mortgage or
repossess an automobile after default on the loan).
The sale of an asset—i.e., the transfer of an ownership interest—
is a transfer that meets all three goals.  The sale of an equitable inter-
est may meet only (1) and (2) above, but may not be recognized in an
action against the ultimate borrower.  An equitable interest also may
be more likely to be challenged in an insolvency or corporate reor-
ganization proceeding.  A promise to transfer assets in the future is
only enforceable against the transferor and thus would meet the first
goal.
1.  True Sale of a Legal Interest.  A sale of an asset to an issuing
SPE is a securitization technique that, although at times complicated
or costly, is likely to be effective in all jurisdictions.  The typical two-
tier transfer, described above in Part III, is structured as a true sale of
a legal interest.
A true sale of an asset is a transfer that is effective against the
transferor, its creditors, its regulator, its liquidator or receiver, and
can be enforced against the borrower.  Such a transfer legally sepa-
rates the credit risk of the assets from that of the transferor.106  The
fully perfected sale of ownership interests107 vests legal title in the is-
suing SPE on the closing day. A sale transaction generally does not
use transfer-related triggers108 because the issuing SPE, as owner of
106. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 29; Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 43,
at 543 (stating that the transfer of risk of loss is the most important factor in a true sale).
107. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 37.
108. Triggers are clauses included in the transaction documents that provide for specific
actions to be taken by one of the transaction participants upon the occurrence of a condition
subsequent.  Examples of triggers are the following: The seller will deposit $3 million in a re-
serve fund if and when delinquencies on the asset pool exceed $5 million; the trustee will give
notice to the collection account bank that the servicer is no longer entitled to withdraw funds
from the account if the servicer’s rating falls below BBB-; or the issuer will draw the full
amount available under the liquidating letter of credit if the letter of credit bank is downgraded
below A-1.  A recent “real world” example is the use of such triggers to solve the concerns of
the Bank of Yokohama with notifying large corporate customers when securitizing loans.  The
Bank resorted to a system of contingent perfection, under which those clients were notified
when certain triggers are met.  The triggers chosen were the downgrading of the Bank’s senior
debt to BBB by Moody’s, or the downgrading of the Bank’s long-term subordinated debt by
Nippon Investor Services to BB+.  See Bank of Yokohama’s Ambitious March, supra note 101,
at 2.  Another recent example are the acceleration events used in transactions by Orico Asset
Funding Japan (a special-purpose, bankruptcy-remote entity).  For those transactions, certain
events (such as seller termination, redemption of a certain class of note, or collection failing to
reach certain limits) lead to a conversion of the notes.  See Yu-Tsung Chang, Orico Asset
Funding Japan (¥30.0 billion series), STRUCTURED FINANCE, Mar. 1998, at 85; Masahiko
DAWSON9MACRO1.DOC 12/16/98  12:43 PM
1998] RATINGS GAMES WITH CONTINGENT TRANSFER 401
the assets, is able to collect scheduled payments and enforce security
against the borrower.  A sale transaction also cuts off the borrower’s
ability to set off against the transferor or discharge the debt by paying
the transferor.
Trigger events, if used in sale transactions, provide additional
comfort only to investors that already own the assets.  Structured fi-
nance transactions generally will include some trigger events to cover
a variety of ancillary or related risks.  For example, a trigger event
may enable the issuer to terminate a revolving period for purchasing
assets, or wind down a transaction when asset quality deteriorates.
Sometimes trigger events are used to safeguard the funds received as
proceeds or distributions on the assets (for example, moving a bank
account to a different financial institution, or requiring the servicer to
establish a segregated bank account).  A trigger event also may be
used to replace the credit support provider.  These triggers, however,
do not affect the validity of the asset transfer and thus should not be
confused with the trigger events associated with contingent transfers,
discussed below in Part VI of this Article.  Where the trigger event
merely touches on ancillary or related risks, the assets can be realized
at all times, notwithstanding the insolvency of the transferor.
2.  True Sale of an Equitable Interest.  A sale of an equitable
interest (more likely to be available in common law jurisdictions or
under securitization statutes) is a transfer of full beneficial (but not
legal) interest that is enforceable against the transferor, its regulator,
its creditors, and also against its liquidator or receiver, without a
significant probability of affecting timely payment on the rated
securities.109
In structured finance transactions that involve the sale of equita-
ble interests, legal ownership may remain with the transferor, but the
economic benefits of assets are not viewed as the property of its in-
solvency estate.  These transactions generally rely on pre-insolvency
trigger events to perfect the legal transfer against the ultimate obli-
gors.  If the trigger event does not occur before an insolvency, the
risk is only that: (1) the obligors get discharged by paying the trans-
feror, (2) the obligors could set off against amounts owed by the
transferor to the obligors, or (3) the issuer would need the coopera-
tion of the transferor, its receiver or liquidator (as legal owner) to en-
Mimura, Orico Asset Funding Japan (¥20.0 billion series), id. at 87.
109. For a description of a typical structure involved in the sale of those interests, see
KRAVITT, supra note 4, at 4-6.
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force or realize the transfer of assets against the ultimate obligors.
Insolvency or reorganization of the transferor does not affect the eq-
uitable interest, as the assets are not available for distribution by the
liquidator or receiver to other creditors of the transferor.
In some transactions, the trigger event could be the actual insol-
vency of the transferor.  For example, in England and Australia, a
durable power of attorney, enforceable notwithstanding the insol-
vency, enables the issuer to accomplish the legal transfer of the assets
even after insolvency proceedings begin.
In many cases, early amortization events are also pre-insolvency
trigger events designed to avoid the necessity of opposing an equita-
ble transfer against a liquidator or receiver of the transferor.  These
early amortization trigger events may help in providing comfort to
investors that the transaction will amortize before insolvency pro-
ceedings.  However, failure to hit a pre-insolvency trigger is unlikely
to affect the ability of the issuer to pay timely principal and interest
on the rated securities.
C.  Secured Loan Transactions Ratable as Structured Finance
In some jurisdictions, it may be possible to structure transactions
as first priority, perfected secured loans if neither an insolvency nor a
reorganization proceeding would interfere with full and timely pay-
ment on the rated securities, or the interference is limited and quanti-
fiable110 (e.g., in the Netherlands the stay following bankruptcy is lim-
ited to two months).111  In these transactions, a liquidity source may
be used to cover timing delays that may occur in an insolvency pro-
ceeding.112  To receive a rating divorced from the issuer’s credit rat-
ing, there must be significant certainty that the holders of the rated
securities have true control over the disposition and enforcement of
the assets.113  In jurisdictions where a liquidator or receiver could sub-
stitute collateral or force its public sale, secured loan securitizations
are unlikely.  Secured loan transactions, however, may use trigger
110. Because in this case the interference can be appropriately considered in the ranking.
111. A stay is governed by arts. 63a and 241a of the Dutch Bankruptcy Act of 1893.  See
ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE, supra note 16, at 170.  See also MULTINATIONAL
COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 15, at P-5.
112. Such sources are commonly called liquidity facilities.  They do not cover the actual
credit risk, but only the risk of untimely payment.  See Structured Financing Techniques, supra
note 43, at 550.
113. For a detailed discussion of factors relevant to achieve true control, see Joanne W.
Rose & Petrina R. Dawson, Analyzing English Secured Loans, S&P STRUCTURED FINANCE,
Sept. 1997, at 33 [hereinafter English Secured Loans].
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events to anticipate commencement of insolvency proceedings where
failure to foreclose or to enforce the collateral before insolvency
would not result in a default on the rated securities.
Standard & Poor’s employs four levels of review for secured
loan securities that are rated as structured finance transactions.114
1.  Status of the Originator.  A secured loan security has the
greatest chance of achieving a rating that is significantly higher than
the rating of the transferor if the transferor is a single-business/single-
activity entity.  If the transferor is a multiple-business/multiple-
activity entity, it is far more complicated to identify and measure
liabilities and risks because of the variations possible as a result of
the numerous combinations of risks between different business
activities.
2.  Full Enforceability of Secured Loans and Security.  The
second level of review is to ensure that, as a legal matter, the secured
loan and the security are enforceable and not subject to any legal
challenge.  In a proposed secured loan structured financing, any
significant risk of challenge to the enforcement of security has
obvious and serious implications for the rating.  Where security is
unenforceable and the originator is insolvent, investors will not be
paid in full.  The security may be challenged on such grounds as the
transferor did not have the capacity to grant the security,
misrepresentation, or fraud.  Security is also vulnerable in the event
of the transferor’s insolvency.  Under English Law, the main grounds
for avoidance in an insolvency are that the transaction is undervalued
or defrauds the transferor’s creditors, that the security is not properly
perfected, preference, extortionate credit bargain, and the grant of
floating security for past value.115
3.  True Control.  The third level of review is to ensure that the
issuer has true control over its security, i.e., the assets that make up
its collateral.  The following factors determine whether the issuer has
true control:
(a) Whether the issuing SPE, as a secured creditor, has control
over the enforcement of its security;
(b) whether the security confers priority in favor of the issuing
SPE against all other creditors; and
114. The following discussion is based on Rose & Dawson, supra note 113.
115. See also MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 15, at I-23.
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(c) whether the security covers appropriate assets and whether
the proceeds of such security, once realized, are adequate to repay
investors.
The greater the lack of control, the greater the risk that an inves-
tor will receive delayed payment of the interest and principal due on
a rated security because of an insolvency.  It may mean that, in addi-
tion to delay in payment, full recovery of interest and principal will
not be possible.
4.  Liquidity.  The fourth level of review is liquidity risk.116
Additional structural requirements, such as credit enhancement and
other measures,117 may be necessary to reduce any incentive to file for
the insolvency of the issuer or otherwise challenge the secured loan
structure rated as a structured finance.118
D.  Transactions Ratable as Enhanced Issuer Credit Rating
Although secured creditors may be entitled to post-insolvency
interest on the rated securities (if the collateral is sufficient to cover
post-insolvency interest), in many cases insolvency or reorganization
proceedings impose a stay on payment of interest or principal due on
secured debt.119  In many jurisdictions, insolvency (liquidation) pro-
ceedings do not affect secured creditors, but corporate reorganization
laws provide that the debtor may ask the courts to place a temporary
stay or moratorium on payments of principal and interest on secured
debt.120  The creditors also may be stayed from enforcing the collat-
eral or may be forced to sell the collateral in time-consuming public
auctions that may well result in additional losses.  Secured creditors,
however, will have a higher likelihood of recovering full principal and
interest than unsecured creditors.  Thus, certain secured debt of an
116. Liquidity risk means the risk that cash flow from securitized assets will not come in
timely enough to pay the securities.  To cover this risk, liquidity facilities are used.  Liquidity
facilities are discussed in note 112, supra.
117. Credit enhancement covers the risk that the SPE might not have enough funds to pay
the securities.  Common forms of credit enhancement are letters of credit issued by banks,
surety bonds by insurance companies, guarantees issued by financial assurance companies, and
subordinated loans from third parties.  See Structured Financing Techniques, supra note 43, at
549.  To cover the risk of untimely payment, liquidity facilities are used.  See note 112, supra.
118. See English Secured Loans, supra note 113, at 31, 36.
119. See SCHWARCZ, supra note 10, at 30.
120. For example, this procedure exists in the Netherlands, France and England.  See
F.G.B. Graaf et al., The Netherlands, in ASSET-BACKED SECURITIZATION IN EUROPE, supra
note 16, at 170; MULTINATIONAL COMMERCIAL INSOLVENCY, supra note 15, at P-5, J-25.
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issuer may be rated higher than the issuer’s credit rating.121  These
enhanced ratings are based on the creditors’ status as holders of first
priority, perfected security interests, the value of the collateral
pledged as security, the time estimated for enforcing the collateral,
and the availability of other assets to pay priority debts of the issuer
in an insolvency (e.g., taxes, insolvency expenses, wage claims, etc.).
The analysis recognizes that payments are likely to be interrupted
immediately after an insolvency filing or declaration.122  The en-
hancement can be as much as one full rating category above the is-
suer credit rating123 and is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.  These
transactions are linked to the issuer credit rating and are subject to
downgrade based on either the deterioration or insufficiency of assets
held as collateral or a decline in the issuer’s creditworthiness.124
These transactions generally use trigger events to anticipate the
insolvency of the issuer (i.e., to give the secured creditor the ability to
enforce the security directly without the help of the transferor).  They
also use trigger events to effectuate a sale and avoid timing delays.
These trigger events are generally requested by the creditors as addi-
tional enhancement.  The failure to hit a trigger, however, does not
affect the amount of security available to pay principal and interest
on the rated securities, but rather only the timing of the recovery.
VI.  CONTINGENT TRANSFERS AND PERFECTION
In some jurisdictions, prospective issuers contend that transac-
tions that rely solely on the occurrence of certain post-closing events
(trigger events) to transfer (or perfect the transfer of) assets at a fu-
ture time should be rated under traditional structured finance meth-
odology.125  Thus, they argue that when a transferor agrees to transfer
121. See generally RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 4, at 65.
122. An example demonstrating this recognition is the first commercial mortgage securiti-
zation in France.  As the Associate Director of S&P’s Structured Finance Group (Paris), Alain
Carron, noted: “We are adapting the U.S. model to incorporate particular aspects of French
borrowing entities and French bankruptcy law.  Investors are concerned that the time taken to
foreclose on property in France is longer than in the U.S., but this has been factored into our
analyses.”  Hart, supra note 15, at 17.
123. See generally RATINGS CRITERIA, supra note 4, at 65.
124. For a recent example, see Spotlight: Japanese Bank Turmoil Reverberates in CP Mar-
ket, S&P STRUCTURED FINANCE, Feb. 1998, at 9 (describing the case of a Japanese bank whose
commercial papers were downgraded from A-1 to A-2 after the issuing bank had its short term
rating cut down to A-2).
125. S&P has received requests to rate transactions structured to include contingent perfec-
tion in Japan, Argentina, Italy, Scotland, the Netherlands, and Mexico.  S&P has not rated
these transactions.  S&P has rated the EMSI transaction that includes a contingent sale but was
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securities with an issuer credit rating of “A” when the transferor’s is-
suer credit rating is downgraded below “BBB,” the transaction
should be rated “AAA” because the assets are “AAA”.  They argue
that the rating agency should look only to the quality of the future as-
sets and not to the issuer credit rating of the transferor.
At first blush, such an argument may seem appealing: if a highly
rated transferor agrees that at some future date it will deliver assets
(or perfect the delivery of assets), then an investor should be better
off than if the investor had relied solely on a promise of the trans-
feror to pay principal and interest.  The trigger event would be some
specified event, including a default by, or downgrade of, the trans-
feror’s issuer credit rating.  However, on closer examination it be-
comes apparent that a promise to deliver assets in the future is only
as good as the creditworthiness of the transferor.  At closing, the in-
vestor has no additional security and, in fact, no additional assurances
that a trigger event will occur.  If the transferor becomes insolvent
before the trigger event occurs, there will be no assets.
Part of the argument favoring contingent transfer arrangements
seems rooted in the belief that a transferor will only become insol-
vent, and thus take advantage of an insolvency proceeding, after a
slow and gradual decline in its creditworthiness accompanied by a
slow migration through the rating categories.  Rating agency default
studies show, however, that a certain percentage of investment grade
transferors default while rated at investment grade levels.126  Gradual
rating migration is by no means assured.  The litmus test for struc-
tured finance transactions, therefore, is whether they can withstand a
transferor default, thus garnering a rating that is independent of the
transferor’s rating.
An additional argument is that, at a minimum, contingent trans-
fers provide the benefit of the assets in those situations in which the
transferor does migrate through the rating categories.  As such, the
rating should consider the future transfer as an enhancement of the
issuer credit rating.  As shown below, however, the presence of the
contingency is likely to be the very event that disrupts the slow mi-
gration by making it more economically palatable to take advantage
of insolvency proceedings.  Moreover, structured financings have
generally withstood periods of severe economic stress that had sig-
rated based on a perfected secured loan analysis, and S&P also rated one Argentine and one
Italian transaction based on the issuer credit rating of the transferor.
126. For an overview of defaults by rating and time, see STANDARD & POOR’S, RATINGS
PERFORMANCE 1997, 3 (1998).
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nificant impact on transferors, such as the U.S. savings and loan crisis
and the U.K. mortgage recession.127  Thus, it seems likely that a con-
tingency allowing transferors to avoid transferring assets in periods of
economic crisis would undoubtedly be invoked, to the detriment of
creditors.128
Transactions that are not ratable above the issuer credit rating
fall into two categories: (1)  those that involve transfers that are ef-
fective as a contractual matter only against the transferor but not
against its creditors, regulator, liquidator, or receiver (for example,
where the transferee is an unperfected buyer or an unperfected se-
cured creditor); or (2)  those that contain solely the promise of the
transferor to grant security or sell assets in the future (whether or not
accompanied by a power of attorney).  These transactions rely on
trigger events to perfect the sale of, or the security interest in, an as-
set prior to an insolvency or reorganization of the transferor.
In a typical proposal, a transferor purports to sell assets to the is-
suing SPE but does not perfect the sale by notifying the ultimate bor-
rower as required by law.129  Alternatively, the transferor agrees to
pledge assets to secure its obligations but does not perfect the pledge
by notifying the ultimate borrowers and, if required, by filing notarial
deeds in the appropriate recording offices.  Instead, in each case the
transferor delivers to the issuer or the trustee prepared notices and a
power of attorney that enable the issuer to perfect the transfer or se-
curity on a future date after the occurrence of a trigger event (for ex-
ample, a downgrade of the transferor).  However, usually a review of
the law in the jurisdiction reveals that an insolvency of the transferor
invalidates and revokes all powers of attorney (whether coupled with
127. See Richard Stow, Arrears Stress U.K. Mortgage-Backed Securities, S&P CREDITWEEK
INT’L, Apr. 6, 1992, at 29 (“To date, no rating actions have been necessary due to asset-quality
decline because transactions include strong credit and liquidity enhancements that serve to pro-
tect the bondholder’s interest from delinquent and defaulting borrowers.”).  See also Kenneth
Degen, ‘AAA’ Affirmed on Bank-Backed Mortgages, S&P CREDITWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 17;
James Titus, Mortgage REITs Fundamentally Sound, S&P CREDITWEEK, July 4, 1988, at 18
(indicating that despite strong economic pressure in the U.S., those markets remained funda-
mentally sound in the view of Standard & Poor’s).
128. The Author recognizes that the counterarguments may not apply with equal force if
the transferor is very highly rated and the trigger is set sufficiently early in the transaction, such
that the transferor would not seek to avoid the transfer.  A highly rated transferor may be eco-
nomically disadvantaged by resorting to untimely insolvency proceedings upon a downgrade
from a high investment grade rating (for example, from AA to AA-).  These enhanced transac-
tions would, however, be more volatile than a traditional asset-backed structure.
129. In some countries, like for example Japan, notification is required.  See Sho/Okoshi
Memo, supra note 99, at 1; Shimeda & Itoh, supra note 16, at 179.  Similar concepts also exist,
for example, in Latin America.  See Doetsch, supra note 44, at 21.
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an interest or not).130  In some cases, the transferor may deposit with
the issuer sufficient funds to enable the transferor to perfect the
transfer (including stamp and transfer taxes).131  More often, the
transferor promises that it will deliver these funds at the time of the
trigger event, arguing that the trigger will occur at a time when the
transferor will not have any financial difficulty.
With nothing more, these transfers are only enforceable as a
contractual matter against the transferor.  Because the borrowers are
not notified and/or notarial deeds are not filed (as required to perfect
the transfer under the law), the transferor’s other creditors have no
means of determining whether the transferor sold or pledged these
assets.  The transfer or pledge exists as an unsecured contract right
only against the transferor.  The transfer is not valid against a regula-
tor, liquidator, receiver, or any third-party creditor.
Both kinds of transactions rely only on a trigger event that is suf-
ficiently prior to the insolvency to perfect the sale or the pledge and
to protect the transfer from challenge in an insolvency proceeding.
This in itself may create additional legal issues.  For example, since
the transfer occurs on a future date, there may no longer be a con-
temporaneous exchange for value at the closing of a transaction.
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the assets would be subject to fur-
ther scrutiny by regulators, creditors, liquidators or receivers as gra-
tuitous, fraudulent or preferential.132  In some jurisdictions, the trans-
fer may not relate back to the date of the original transaction.133  The
transfer, almost by definition, occurs at a time when the financial
condition of the transferor has deteriorated.  Many jurisdictions have
long look back (“suspect”) periods before an insolvency in which gra-
130. For example, in Japan according to art. 653 of the MINPO, bankruptcy terminates a
power of attorney mandate.  See Sho/Okoshi Memo, supra note 99, at 2.  But this is different in
England, where a power of attorney is enforceable notwithstanding an insolvency.
131. Several jurisdictions have transfer taxes, which can be sizable.  See Levy & Salomão
Advogados, Credit Assignments by ‘Special Purpose Companies’ and the Tax on Financial
Transactions (IOF), LATIN AMERICA & BUS. REP., Feb. 1998, at 11.  Ireland has a stamp duty
on certain instruments.  See Irish, supra note 16, at 3.  England and Italy also have stamp taxes.
See Taylor, supra note 16, at 37, 48.
132. For a discussion of the treatment of fraudulent conveyances in an insolvency situation,
see also 1 FRANKEL, supra note 2, at 414.
133. See, e.g., Douglas A. Doetsch,  Emerging Market Cash Flow Securitizations Take Off,
INT’L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1996, at 19 (“Virtually no precedents exist in most countries as to
whether a future export ‘sale’ would be respected in a bankruptcy proceeding.”); Parolai &
Lewis, supra note 16, at 15 (stating that it is unclear under French law whether future receiv-
ables can be securitized if “the amount is not determinable at the time of transfer or when the
amount depends on a subsequent action or utilization. . . .”).
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tuitous or preferential transfers can be avoided.134  Failure to perfect
in a timely manner (or the avoidance of a transfer perfected too close
to insolvency) will lead to default on the rated securities.
If an insolvency occurs before the trigger event in one of the
above two transaction categories, the holders of the rated securities
are at best unsecured creditors of the transferor.  In many cases they
may be viewed as subordinated unsecured creditors.  If the transac-
tion documents provide for recourse only to the assets but not to the
transferor, the liquidator may use the assets to pay other priority
debts of the transferor (such as wages, taxes, and even other credi-
tors).  Once the assets are exhausted, the holders of the rated securi-
ties will have no claim against the transferor and will receive no dis-
tribution in a liquidation or reorganization.  Thus, a promise to
deliver security or assets in the future should not be viewed as adding
creditworthiness to an issuer’s promise to pay principal and interest
in the future.  A power of attorney that is not enforceable in an insol-
vency cannot enhance the promise to pay principal and interest.
Moreover, the presence of a trigger event could provide an in-
centive to a transferor to seek reorganization or bankruptcy protec-
tion earlier than otherwise anticipated to try to prevent the transfer
of assets.  A trigger event also encourages creditors to petition for
liquidation of the issuer.  By avoiding the transfer (or the perfection
of a security interest), the creditors could share in assets that would
not be available to them after a transfer occurs (or a security interest
is perfected).  For regulated entities (e.g., banks or other financial in-
stitutions), the trigger may accelerate regulatory intervention.  Most
regulators are able to declare moratoria on payments and other
transfers (which generally would include the exercise of powers of at-
torney) to preserve the assets and the liquidity of the transferor.
Therefore, the trigger event will serve as the catalyst for an early de-
fault in the rated transactions.
A rating that relies on the promise of a future transfer, a con-
tractual right only, is fraught with uncertainty.  The rating should not
be based solely on the credit quality of the underlying assets because,
in most jurisdictions, a breach of contract is not enforceable by spe-
cific performance.135  If the transferor breaches its promise to transfer
134. See note 104 and accompanying text, supra.
135. It should be noted that in common law countries specific performance is an equitable
remedy and therefore only available when money damages will not suffice.  See BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1139 (6th ed. 1990).  Generally, civil law countries have a different perspective
and allow for specific performance as a standard contract remedy.  This difference can be par-
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the assets, the sole remedy of the holders of the rated securities is an
action for damages in local courts.  Complex, costly, and time-
consuming litigation should not be viewed as a ready substitute for
creditworthy collateral.  Irrevocable powers of attorney may mitigate
the risk of breach of contract, but they are generally avoidable in an
insolvency or reorganization procedure.136  Therefore, a power of at-
torney will increase the incentive to use insolvency proceedings pro-
actively.  If this happens, the holders of the rated securities would be,
at best, unsecured creditors of the transferor.
VII.  CONCLUSION
Structures that rely on trigger events to perfect the sale of assets,
or to perfect security interests at a future date, often are called con-
tingent transfer or contingent perfection structures.  The term
“contingent,” however, may imply more comfort than the legal analy-
sis reveals.  Indeed, perfection of the collateral or the transfer may
not be possible.  These structures may also increase the incentives of
the transaction participants to commence proceedings to avoid the
transaction.
Given such negative incentives and the genuine risk of loss on
the rated securities, it is inappropriate and analytically compromising
to rely on a contingent transfer to enhance the rating above the issuer
credit rating.
ticularly seen in the Convention on the International Sale of Goods, which adopted the civil
law approach towards specific performance.  See JOSEPH M. LOOKOFSKY, UNDERSTANDING
THE CISG IN THE USA 66 (1995).
136. See LOOKOFSKY, supra note 135, at 66.  See also note 85, supra.
